John vs the Synoptics, for Paul Williams

[Nota Bene: the webmaster of the Answering Abraham blog has been kind enough to include this guest post, by Denis Giron.]

Last Monday, Paul Williams posted an entry on his blog, which simply contained the following portion from James Dunn's "The Living Word":

The most difficult case of all for Christians who hold the Bible in high regard: the Fourth Gospel [John]. Here the matter is peculiarly sensitive, since so much seems to depend on it. For if John’s Gospel is straightforward history, then we have in it the most amazing and powerful self-testimony of Jesus. If John’s Gospel is unvarnished history then then all that Christians need ever claim for Jesus is clearly attested there, and by Jesus himself. If John is correct, then the old apologetic-evangelistic question is unavoidable: the one who makes such claims for himself is either mad, bad or God.
 
But the very starkness and unequivocalness of these claims is what begins to raise the nagging question in the mind. If Jesus made such claims, why do the other Gospels make no use of them? What Evangelist having among the traditions which had been passed to him such wonderful sayings as the ‘I ams’ – ‘I am the resurrection and the life’; I am the way, the truth and the life’; ‘Before Abraham was, I am’; and so on – what Evangelist having to hand such sayings could ignore them completely? The question once raised, cannot be squashed into silence, since the integrity of that whole apologetic-evangelistic approach is at stake.
 

I have attempted to discuss this subject with Mr. Williams before, but he has unfortunately ignored what was presented to him, only to return to his original position, as if he has yet to come across any rebuttals. Therefore, here I would like to present the arguments which have been presented to Mr. Williams, so that others might have one possible response whenever he takes an approach like that captured in the excerpt, above.

To begin, the question posed by Dunn (as well as others, like E.P. Sanders) should be examined. How do we explain the Gospel of John having material which the Synoptics lack, yet which some would speculate the Synoptic authors would have used were it available to them? In a correspondence which I had with Mr. Williams on FaceBook, in the summer of 2012, I proposed that a good place to start might be John 21:25.

That verse is important, and relevant, because it demonstrates that the Christian position should be that what appears in the four Gospels captures only a small fraction of all that Jesus said and did. Even without the witness of John 21:25, it should be obvious that such is the case. Note that there are just under fifty thousand words in the Greek text of the Synoptics. If one were to guess that half of that is quoting Jesus, then the conclusion would be that one could read aloud all statements attributed to Jesus by the Synoptics within just a few hours. Ergo, the statements attributed to Jesus in the Synoptics represent only a very small fragment of what would have been said during a multiple years long ministry. This would mean there is considerable material which is not included in the Synoptics, which would in turn mean it would be misguided to consider the statements in John to probably be fictional simply because they differ from the Synoptic fragment.

Once that is understood, the next point to be made is that the initially intended uses for each Gospel (or for the Synoptics vis a vis John) could have differed from one another, thus resulting in one corpus drawing out portions which do not appear in another. The Greek Orthodox priest John Romanides offered an explanation precisely along these lines:

[T]he Gospel of John has the mysteries as its basis and as its purpose the correlation of the historic life of Christ with the present mysterial life in Christ and experience of the community. When we take into account that the Christians carefully and systematically avoided all discussions of the deeper meaning of the mysteries, not only with the hostile outside world but even with the catechumens, then we are able to understand the use of the Gospels in the first Church, and many of the problems raised by biblical criticism are solved. Since the baptized Christians did not discuss the mysteries even with the catechumens, it is sufficiently clear that the fourth Gospel was used in the ancient Church for completing and finishing the catechism of the recently illumined, that is newly baptized. It was particularly suited to this purpose and distinguished from the other Gospels mainly because of its clear dogmatic, mysterial, and apologetical tone. We do not find in John the systematic preparation of catechumens for that is found in Matthew and Mark. This is why John does not begin with the baptism of Christ but with "In the beginning was the Logos...and the Logos was made flesh."^[1]

Similarly, Joachim Jeremias argued^[2] at length that there is evidence within the New Testament itself that different authors deliberately abstained from including deeper traditions in certain texts, out of concerm that such was not appropriate. Jeremias also argues that such carefulness was common among both Jews and non-Jews in the ancient near east. Such a practice lasted for centuries among Christians, as, in the fourth century, bishops in Alexandria expressed alarm at the fact that the deeper mysteries of the faith were being exposed to catechumens and non-believers, when they wrote:

They are not ashamed to parade the sacred mysteries before Catechumens, and worse than that, even before heathens: whereas, they ought to attend to what is written, 'It is good to keep close the secret of a king;' and as the Lord has charged us, 'Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast your pearls before swine.' We ought not then to parade the holy mysteries before the uninitiated, lest the heathen in their ignorance deride them, and the Catechumens being over-curious be offended.^[3]

Therefore, it should not be any surprise that the aforementioned Father Romanides summed up the issue thusly:

The differences between the Synoptics and the Gospel of John, therefore, are not disagreements as many maintain. On the contrary, they clearly pertain to a difference in depth and fulfillment of the Synoptics by the fourth Gospel in accordance with the catechetical needs of the Church.^[4]

The simple conclusion from all of the above is that the differences between the Synoptics and John need to necessitate that material distinct to the latter is fictional. It is entirely possible for different NT authors to have sufficient reason to not include a given tradition in a given text, even if the critics are unable to discern such reasons.

 

What about the Qur'an?

 

Interestingly, the argument can be placed back on the Qur'an. The Qur'an has material which does not appear in the Synoptics, yet which we might speculate certain authors would have wanted to employ. For example, consider the story in Soora Maryam 19:27-33, where Christ engages in public theological discourse while still an infant, in defense of His mother. Being that Matthew and Luke affirmed the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, might we not think they would have wanted to include a tradition in which her own child miraculously defends her before a crowd which had insinuated she had become pregnant via improper relations?

Any argument a Muslim attempts to raise in defense of the Qur'anic text will ultimately affirm (whether tacitly or overtly) this simple point: even if a text which came after the Synoptics has material that does not appear in the Synoptics (including material some might think the Synoptic authors might have wanted to use), that need not reflect negatively on the historicity of said material. Once such a point is conceded, it undermines any Muslim use of the relevant argument against John.

It is worthy of note that I presented precisely this point to Mr. Williams, via Twitter, last Spring:

Amazingly, Mr. Williams' sole response was to throw back at me the very verse I had appealed to in a correspondence with him nearly two years prior (John 21:25):



I tried to discuss the issue further with him, but he, unfortunately, had no further comment. While no disrespect is intended, I feel compelled to remark that I take this as evidence of an unwillingness on Mr. Williams' part to fully accept the full implications of the arguments and methodologies which he employs as a stick with which to beat Christianity.

End Notes

1. John S. Romanides, The Ancestral Sin, (Zephyr, 2002), pp. 72-73.
2. Joachim Jeremias' The Eucharistic Words of Jesus, (Oxford, 1955), 73-86.
3. The Encyclical Letter of the Council of Egypt, in Athanasius, Defence Against the Arians, part I, chapter 11, in Philip Schaff & Henry Wace (eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, (Cosimo, 2007), vol. IV, p. 106.
4. Romanides, opere citato, p. 73, n. 18.

An Atheist Defends Evidentialism

Firstly the Atheist explains what evidentialism is:



I believe there are other evidentialists liking this video long side of the Atheists evidentialists:

Did you observe some really large loopholes the Atheist is jumping into?

Other commentators certainly have.

One person even made a video responding with a few objections:



So the "evidentialist" atheist saw some of these objections and then attempted to defend evidentialism:



Firstly a small comment. The atheist asserts he is not making whatever assumptions he would like and then mentions assumptions he would like to make but is not. However this only proves he is making less assumptions than he would like to be, but he is still making a number of assumption that he does like. He contrasts himself with Theist Evidentialists who make a number of assumptions they would like, but less assumptions than they want. However none of this shows one assumption is better than another, which ought to be the case.

I post these two videos as an example of a good model to show how reality is oft assumed and represented in an evidenced based conversation in general. It is nearly always assumed that the burden of proof is on the one who makes an assertion (positive statement) therefore requiring evidence which is justification for possessing knowledge. Rather humans should begin on any possible common ground which would begin with axioms, properly warranted beliefs. It is often mistakenly assumed as a general rule of thumb that all beliefs require justification. There are millions of Christians who share a similar epistemology to our atheist friend sometimes unknowingly adopting evidentialism as the ipso facto approach or methodology to pursue in a productive dialogue or conversation with an atheist, or even a sound epistemology in general for those Christians who are aware of it.

I remember as a sixteen year old teenager, being asked in one of my very first encounters with an atheist: "What evidence do you have for your God?". I immediately began to explain how the universe required a beginning and therefore a transcendental cause, how creation required a creator, how a painting requires a painter, how many things appear to be designed and therefore show us a designer.

What I didn't know consciously was that the swing of burden of proof was shifted and then committed unto me. What I didn't know was that certain special types of beliefs do not require justification and therefore can plainly be called assumptions or presuppositions. What I didn't know is that all humans had these kinds of beliefs either, yet most were unaware of them. As René Descartes stated some types of beliefs are "self-evident", or at-least many beliefs rest on unjustifiable meta-beliefs.

I presented you these two videos so not only do you get an idea of what attitude atheists in general
adopt in a conversation with a believer but the underlying epistemology they utilize which at times is unfortunately either knowingly or unknowingly adopted by the Christian Theist. Between the years 2008-2014 I would of been some what impressed with these videos as an atheist, as it appears (as the video suggests) that evidentialism is some what self evident, it's part of our make up, our cognitive psychology as humans, our daily experience. I would believe it's rational to make these kinds of necessary assumptions and believe that all humans ultimately must share in this process with me, that simply adding God on top was either unnecessary or superfluous. Together as humans we can all take on the most basic weak assumptions and build out way to the top from the bottom so to speak.

To end this post, I don't plan on giving a highly detailed review or critique of evidentialism, rather I want to bring forth awareness and hope that my pressupositionalist (and other) readers will identify severe problems contained within the video.

He originally asserts that: "I exist" in the first video is self evident and can be known and inferred intuitively, while in the second video he classifies this as an assumption along with others. So I will assume since his second video is the accurate one, and that he views self existence as an assumption. But since he does not accept coherentism or verificationism, perhaps he actually holds both views and therefore is a consistent atheist by being inconsistent. The irony being: to be a consistent atheist is to be inconsistent.

Hence his three  basic presuppositions he makes, firstly I exist. Secondly something other than me exists (and therefore my senses are sometimes accurate) and finally physical evidence is the standard to determine what is a justifiable belief.

However at the end of the second video, he ends by saying:

"I think this is a sufficient amount of defense for evidentialism to justify moving on. If you would like to present an alternative epistemology that you think better explains justification, you're free to do so...but I think I've sufficiently justified evidentialism to the point we can talk about what happens when we apply evidentialism to the hypothesis of God (17:17)"

I would now like to just present a few quotation from his first video that may seem at odds with his conclusion.

"How do I know that anything outside of myself exists? How do I know I'm not just experiencing a dream? How do I know i'm not just a brain in a vat experiencing a computer simulation? How do I know that I myself, am not just a program in a computer simulation? The answer is: I don't. I don't know that anything I see or experience is actually real, I have to make a presupposition, an assumption (2:44)"

And:

"But without the presupposition that at least some of my perceptions are accurate I have no where to go epistemologically, without this presupposition it is game over. I maybe wrong, I may actually be a brain in a vat experiencing simulated illusions but I have no choice but to at least initially assume that I am not just a brain in a vat, If I want to go anywhere meaningful epistemologically. (3:58) 

And:

"Even for the purpose of defending the use of evidence, I have to use evidence (5:56)"

Hence none of his presuppositions have explanatory power, they are purely assumptive in nature, and none of them are justified, so I must disagree with his conclusion.

On his third presupposition (which he unjustifiably argues for using evidence) he sets a false dichotomy between evaluating God with evidentialism or rationalism, rather than using God as an initial presupposition that we have no choice but to use in evaluating these epimsteologies to begin with. He judges that evidence is the basis for math and logic and concludes rationalism will be eventually become obsolete:

"The learning process is extremely evidence based...in fact I suspect that evidentialism will win this argument precisely because it's the actual basis of human learning and rationalism isn't" 

Of course the actual basis of human learning, the fact that humans learn some truths via evidence as children has nothing to do with evidentialism or rationalism being true or false.

Penalty for Apostasy in Islam is STILL Execution - Tariq Ramadan Answered

One of the best female debaters I know decided to answer the challenge of Tariq Ramadan who doesn't believe apostates should be killed according to Islam, (although he admits his position is in the minority). You can see his original challenge here

If you guys enjoyed this response video (or have objections) be sure to let us know since she may be interested in making more videos in the future as a member of the non-Muslim brotherhood debate alliance.

Appearances Still Standing: (Quran 4:157)

Translation: "God himself has said the exact opposite to the experts"

As I was gathering a quote for a friend, I managed to stumble upon more intellectual turmoil from noted Muslim Apologist Paul Williams (PW), (shown in the picture to the right):

"Concerning Jesus’ death, scholars assume it happened because in their worldview (usually Christian or secular) THERE IS NO OBVIOUS REASON TO THINK OTHERWISE. BUT GOD himself has told mankind in his final Revelation that (appearances notwithstanding) he was NOT crucified."

Unfortunately for PW, he is actually right. There is truly no good reason to think otherwise, Jesus was certainly crucified. The problem for Muslims is that they have no certain knowledge of this event, they follow nothing but conjecture namely the Quran, they have an abundance of doubt in rationality, reason, history and God's word, this of course is due to Allah and his incompetent Messenger who left no coherent tafsir (exegesis) of these inexplicable passages until some uninspired Muslims fabricated such tafsir hundreds of years after the Qur'an was revealed in an attempt to salvage Muslims from disbelief in some of the absurdity contained in the Qur'an. If a revelation purportedly from God contradicts all known principles of rationality and revelation (supernatural and natural) and makes preposterously untenable assertions like: "Jesus was not crucified", the revelation immediately becomes suspect in the eyes of free thinkers who accept reason, theologians who accept revelation and historians who accept history and historical evidence.

Why would an all knowing God contradict all known sound evidence of a truly historical account? Why would an all knowing God violate established principles of reason, historiography and his own perfect and complete previously given revelation? The very mechanism that all historians use to understand all history is disapproved and shunned by God on this especially seldom occasion, which in logic is known as a logical fallacy called special pleading.

The Islamic God not only decides to contradict the only reliable evidence we have on this matter as deemed by all historians irrespective of religious beliefs but additionally requires us to believe his unproven word against the methodology that scholars and historians use to establish, well..any historical event! This is the Islamic equivalent to an infamous caricature of creationism namely the "Satan planted the fossils" theory, except in the case of Muslims, they are actually utterly and completely serious, while no qualified creationist accepts the former.

An even larger dilemma arises in employing such common Islamic fideism, this essentially means that all of history and the practice of historiography can only be accepted when it matches up with the Quran. This causes history to become a meaningless discipline, why have history in the first place? when your history is actually determined theologically even in opposition to sound reason and evidence? It also means no history is trustworthy, it all becomes certifiably contestable and (appearances notwithstanding) practically unreliable without theological approval, history only appears to be the way it is, but we can never understand the substance behind the specious appearance because Allah provides no rational tools for us to utilize other than fideism. This leads to a type of reluctant 'historical agnosticism' in which the only certainty we can have is salvaged by special 'divine revelation'. In this world view there is nothing we can know for certain except for the cherry picked Islamic history which in turn repeats the fallacy known as special pleading.

If Muslims are going to appeal to external authorities such as 'science' to confirm the Quran as a so called 'scientific miracle', then assuredly these same kind of external authorities could also be used as a sufficient disproof of the Quran as infamous Muslim Apologist Hamza Tzortzis recently observed and recanted this 'Science in the Quran polemic' for this and other reasons. But for those Muslims who refuse to be as consistent as Mr. Tzortzis this creates an untenable epistemological vacuum with the fabric of Islam itself.

Finally if there is no sound reason for any historian to deny the crucifixion, and God would require us to believe the opposite to sound reason and professional opinion and historical evidence, then God himself ought to be expected to provide such a reason in light of all prevalent existing knowledge. Alas the Quran offers no clear or defensible reason.

There is one possible reason one could extrapolate out of the Quran with the aid of allowing Muslims to gather external tafsir fabricated by later Muslims hundreds of years after the Qur'an was revealed. The idea is that God wished to rescue his prophet Jesus from a cruel and unjustifiable death and punish the disbelievers for there rebellion. Yet what kind of rebellion? For this we are dependent once again on actual history (the New Testament) as the ambiguous Qur'an does not provide any historical narrative. And of course such Islamic reasoning is (appearances still standing) purely theological in nature and unconvincing in rational substance.

The Old Testament, the New Testament and the Qur'an have all confirmed that many Prophets were martyrs, hence there is no special reason to save Jesus from death. Fundamentally anyone could construct a theological narrative to explain away any situation, but God gives us rationality to prevent such misuse of his revelation.

The punishment given to the Jewish disbelievers in Christ is unspecified by the Qur'an but if we speculate we could say the punishment was two-fold. First God sent them delusion for their disbelief (he blinded them after they rejected Christ by deceiving them into thinking they did something which they did not) which secondly resulted in a lack of repentance providing them a one way ticket to the hell-fire. However God punishes all disbelievers in the hereafter hence this is not necessary nor useful.

The objection then is not that God doesn't have the power to save Jesus before death but rather that God has no desire to save Jesus before his death without good reason, or revealing that reasoning against the overwhelming evidence we indeed do have. God offers no historical or evidential clarification in the face of a multiple of good reasons to think he died. This argument could be expounded upon I am just offering the foundation. For those of you who think that Elijah or Enoch might be an exception to the rule, you would need to read this post again carefully to understand the differences in the case of God with Islamic Issa and Biblical Elijah and Enoch.

One last thought. If all the evidence points us to PW as a self professed Homosexual, I wonder if this kind of evidence and data is truly trustworthy in an Islamic world view? How can we really be sure (assuming Islamic Theology on Allah) that PW is simply not cast under Allah's spell? That he is not taking a rid on the Magic Camel Bus which gas is fueled by Tawheed smoke? Perhaps PW is more like Allah than is commonly thought ("there is none like him"), since in public PW is Muslim again, he certainly made it appear this way but the contrary is also true. A Muslim cannot know anything in their own world view which is why PW is so confused like his lord Allah, Christ Willing more posts about this in the future.